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ABSTRACT
Child Abuse Material (CAM) is widely available on P2P networks. Over the last decade several
tools were made for 24/7 monitoring of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks to discover suspects that use
these networks for downloading and distribution of CAM. For some countries the amount of cases
generated by these tools is so great that Law Enforcement (LE) just cannot handle them all. This
is not only leading to backlogs and prioritizing of cases but also leading to discussions about the
possibility of disrupting these networks and sending warning messages to potential CAM offenders.
Recently, investigators are reporting that they are creating more serious cases on Ares Galaxy
(Ares) than on other open P2P networks. Little has been done on automatic prioritization of cases
with the information obtained from data that is available on P2P networks. Cases are mostly
selected based on the highest number of CAM, while studies indicate that the abusers are most
likely to be found not within that top user list. What kind of information can we use to prioritize
cases in another way? Is it possible to disturb the network by sending warning messages and
sharing fake material? Although the past years have seen a lot of successful CAM cases, generated
in several countries, there is still little known about the Ares network. Although Ares network is
open source, the protocol is not documented and the program does not come with serious
documentation or support. In this paper, we present first of all a forensic analysis of using of Ares
network in relation with the distribution of CAM. We then describe forensic artifacts found on an
Ares computer involved in CAM.
Keywords: P2P network forensics, Ares Galaxy network, Child Abuse Material, forensic artifacts,
registry dencryption
INTRODUCTION
Ares started as a P2P [1] Gnutella client in
2002, but after 6 months [2] they started with
their own new network. This Ares network
used a system where a client (clientnode) in
normal user mode could be promoted to a
client that also acts as a server called
supernode, the same methodology and name
that was used by Fasttrack [3], a closed source
P2P network. A server (supernode) keeps
records of connected clientnodes and their
shared files and this information is used by the
supernodes for handling searches of connected
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nodes. Systems like this are called
decentralized networks [4] because the servers
(supernodes) are not owned by a centralized
company or person. This makes it harder to
hold them responsible for the contents that are
being shared on the network, unlike a
centralized system, like Napster, that was
easily held responsible and forbidden [5].
Even though the Ares network does not
keep statistics it is reasonable to assume that
the network consists of hundreds of Ares
supernodes and a couple of million Ares
clientnodes. The clientnode hold a list of
available supernodes and connects to a
maximum of five of them. Each supernode can
handle a maximum of 400 clientnodes.
Ares is used all over the world for the
exchange of all kinds of files, including
copyrighted material, like music and movies.
Ares can be moreover used for accessing
existing chatrooms and users can start their
own public or even private chatrooms. These
chatrooms look like the traditional IRC
channels.
In order to make it more difficult for users
to be tracked by for example the music and
movie industry, countermeasures are used in
Ares network. In fact, this network does not
provide statistics about the number of users
and the numbers of their shared files.
Searching is automatically limited by the
system by countermeasures in both the normal
user mode and the supernode mode. On the
used computer, users can easily wipe the
history of previous searches and information
about shared files is stored in encrypted data-
files. Other information such as the last time
connected, first time used, time online are
encrypted before they are saved into the
registry.
For a very long time, Ares was not
disturbed by fake files, over the past few years
this has changed, but the developers wrote
detecting modules and succeeded in limiting
the effects. The software is probably not owned
by a company but maintained by private
developers and therefore more difficult to
approach by investigators. This all makes Ares
a network that is very suitable for people that
want to exchange CAM. On the discussion
page at the SourceForge community [6] a
developer offered his assistance to block CAM
on Ares but it doesn’t look like his offer was
accepted. One of the forum members
responded: “Ares uses a decentralized protocol
for it is searches and downloads and developers
can't be held responsible for what users share
on the network.”
As mentioned above, Ares does not support
statistics, which makes is difficult to estimate
how many users involved in CAM, how many
CAM files are shared on this network. On top
of this, there are a lot of clients on Ares that
share fake files, files from which the real
content has nothing to do with the indication
that the filename, title and other meta-
information would suggest. Some of them are
just files with other content shared with
deliberately wrong filenames, title and other
meta- information. Sometimes just as a joke or
maybe by mistake but also often likely to
discourage the exchange of copyrighted or
illegal material. There are also clients that
deliberately respond to searches, by reporting
that the files are found, and then generate fake
files on the fly with the search phrase in a part
of the filename. A lot of these generated files
are zip files, containing .wmv (windows media
file). These .wmv files redirect the user to
websites that spread malware. The author has
also seen generated fake files containing
advertisements, for example for ringtones.
In this paper, we present a forensic analysis
of using Ares network world-wide in relation
with the distribution of CAM. We also
moreover contribute a comprehensive
description of traces on a computer running
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Ares. The rest of this paper is structured as
follows: Section 2 shows the background of this
research including related work in this domain.
We present the analysis the use of Ares
network in relation with CAM in Section 3.
We describe and discuss on experiment results
of analyzing the forensic artifacts in the
computer of using Ares in Section 4. We
conclude and discuss on future work in Section
5.
RELATED WORK
In literature, there are very few programs
dealing with forensic artifacts in a computer
running Ares. There is moreover almost no
information on how to process these artifacts
with other alternative programs for justifying
the evidence.
On the other hand, several studies have
been performed over the past decade on the
relationship between CAM and active sex
offenders as well as the distribution of CAM on
P2P networks. However, there is still very
little research on this subject when it comes to
the Ares Network. In [7], they describe that
the proportion of Child Pornography
Possession (CP) arrestees who were identified
as child molesters in cases that started out as
CP investigations dropped from 16% in 2006
to 10% in 2009, while there was some
surprisingly increase in the proportion of
arrested CP possessors that have images
depicting young children and sexual violence.
They suggest that this maybe caused because
some in law enforcement may be targeting
those with more extreme images in the belief
that these offenders are also more likely to be
molesters. Unfortunately they cannot speak
confidently to the issue of exactly how law
enforcement should prioritize CP investigations
if they want to catch active molesters. They
say that this does not mean that those
priorities are inappropriate for the goal of
protecting children since child pornography
possession has its own corrosive dynamics. But
it should spur the search for additional data to
evaluate the best police strategies for
protecting children.
Authors in [8] concluded “Noncontact
offenders anchored on lower-SAP-level indecent
images of children (IIOC), with no preference
in terms of the age, gender, or sexual action. In
contrast, dual offenders preferred higher SAP
(Sentencing Advisory Panel) levels and
also possessed IIOC within a smaller age range,
which tended to match their sexual contact
victim in terms of age and gender. Moreover,
the more severe the contact child sexual
offense committed, the higher the proportion of
penetrative IIOC possessed.”
In [9], authors describe that systematically
gathered and analyzed data on P2P can give
an idea of the scope and characteristics of
CAM on P2P networks and that such
measurement can be used to combat the
problem. They also mentioned that
investigative tools can be used to help law
enforcement with prioritizing cases. In [10],
authors report that their results suggest a
homology between Internet behaviors, indecent
images of children (IIOC) possession and
victim selection.
ANALYSING THE USE
OF ARES NETWORK
IN RELATION WITH
CAM
In this section we describe first of all the
worldwide use of Ares network in relation with
the distribution and downloading of CAM.
This was done by gathering data with a search
and monitoring tool based on the original
program. This information is used for the
statistics by country and language. In order to
analyze Ares network, we used two different
Ares clients to gather information. For the
most significant part of the examinations, the
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original latest Ares Galaxy Sourceforge client
was used. It was used to gather information
about traces on the computer and traces and
statistics on the Ares network. In addition an
alternative client KCeasy [11] and the under-
laying giFT protocol [12] was used to gather
traces and statistics on the Ares network.
Although the giFT protocol itself is
documented [13], giFT has no documentation
about the under-laying Ares protocol.
For traces on the computer the gathered
data and information was checked by reading
the open source and checking results with a
simple hex editor and calculator. We also used
AresDecrypter [14] based on the information
found in the open source. AresDecrypter was
validated and approved for use by the FBI's
Computer Analysis Response Team.
Furthermore, Encase 7 and 2 special enscripts
(Ares Dat File Decryptor (V1.3.1).EnPack and
Ares Registry Report (V1.1.0).enpack) [15]
were used to compare the results. We also
modified the original client and forced it to
write information into logfiles. This was done
for incoming and outgoing data on the network
and read and written data to the operating
system (registry and files). In case data was
being encrypted or decrypted the data was
written encrypted and unencrypted to these
logfiles. This information was compared with
network data captured with Wireshark [16]
and the information that was retrieved with
the mentioned tools above.
Statistics by country
Statistical information was gathered by
searching for CAM related keywords and
known CAM hashes. This was done worldwide
with the use of the Roundup Investigative Tool
over a period of 4 months, from September
2014 until January 2015. Only results for files
with hashes that were already identified were
gathered. The number for (known hashes) the
database of known hashes, was approximately
4,1 million. This resulted in 3,568,462 unique
IP-addresses worldwide. To exclude possible
“accidental downloads,” IP-addresses with less
than 3 results were dropped, which resulted in
1,553,222 unique IP-addresses. The IP-
addresses were matched to a country with the
free GeoIP table from Maxmind.com[17] and
with information from several sources on the
internet found with Google the countries were
matched with their spoken languages. The
percentage of the country population and the
percentage of the (IP population) total number
of Internet users for the country, was
calculated with information from the CIA
factbook [18]. The CIA factbook information
for country population was from 2014 and the
IP population was from 2009. With this
measurement we have to take into account
that countries with high numbers of dynamic
IP-addresses will score relatively higher than
countries with high numbers of static IP-
addresses (Figure 1 and Figure 2). We also
have to take into account that the searches
were only done in the English language and
the known hashes used were mainly collected
in investigations situated in the United States.
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Figure 1.  Absolute number of IP –address sharing at least 3 CAM files
Figure 2. Percentage of IP population sharing at least 3 CAM files
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There was another measurement done on
the available chatrooms. This was done on
three different days by starting Ares and
starting the Chatroom pane and counting the
advertised languages for the available
chatrooms and then matching the IP-addresses
of the chatrooms with the Maxmind GeoIP
table. From these statistics we can see that
there is definitely a close relationship between
the popularity of Ares, the Spanish language
and the region Latin America. It is obvious
that the region Latin America is strongly
represented in the absolute numbers of CAM,
followed by the United States and Europe
(Figure 3).
If we take a closer look and take into
account the internet population for each
country then we can see that after Spanish
speaking countries, the Arabic speaking
countries come in second place. It is likely that
when internet density grows in these countries
they will face the same problems with CAM on
P2P.
Identifying fake files
Ares is contaminated with fake files. Searching
for CAM related keywords will generate results
that lead to files infected with malware. These
files are normally provided by supernodes that
probably generate theses files on the fly and
therefore each search for a keyword will lead to
these infected files. By generating a search
request for something that really cannot exist,
fake files and the related nodes can be
identified and blocked. This was done by
searching for a string consisting of randomly-
generated hex characters.
With this method it is possible to discard a
large amount of possibly incorrect information.
In our experiment, ten unique identified fake
files were downloaded and investigated. They
all had nothing to do with CAM, eight of them
were related to malware and two files were
related to advertisements.
Gathering information as a
supernode
Normally a clientnode can become a supernode
automatically, but only if it meets minimum
system requirements like the speed of the
processor and connection, amount of memory,
total uptime, and also a network connection
that is not firewalled.
We changed the code and promoted our
clientnode to supernode manually. Also the
used TCP and UDP port on the NAT router is
forwarded to the IP-address used by this
supernode.
Figure 3. Match countries for IP addresses of ARES Chatrooms
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In our experiment, in the period from May
31, 2015 to June 6, 2015 during approximately
87 hours, we collect data of clientnodes
connected and logged in to the server. This
monitoring was stopped when we have 5000
clientnodes that share at least one file. If we
have a closer look at these 5000 clientnodes, we
notice that 24 of them share three or more files
identified as CAM with the known hashes.
That means 0.48 percent of the 5000 sharing
users or 0.06 percent of the 38764 total
connected users.
In total 426 files were identified as CAM,
103 files were images and 258 were videos and
65 files were other types. From this
information it looks like the amount of CAM
video files is much higher than the amount of
CAM images. However we only have a table of
identified hash values for CAM and could not
know how many of these hashes are related to
videos or images. Therefore we also compared
the filenames and meta-information (serialized
string, etc.) with a list of the following
keywords: ‘babyshivid,’ ‘hussyfan,’ ‘kingpass,’
’lsm,’ ’mylola,’ ’pedo,’ ’pthc,’ ’ptsc,’ ’sdpa.’
This resulted in 39 images and 180 videos that
are possibly CAM. This also confirms that the
amount of shared CAM videos is much higher
than the amount of images.
ANALYSING THE
FORENSIC
ARTIFACTS IN THE
COMPUTER
There are four important locations where we
can find the forensic artifacts related to the use
of Ares:  the registry, the %localappdata%
folder, the Ares shared folder, and download
folder. Some of the data, that can be valuable
for a forensic investigation, is encrypted, but
the encryption routines and the variables
needed to decrypt this data is available in the
open source code.
Use of the program, default
settings and behavior
When the program is installed, there are
several default settings and users can change
these settings. Almost all of the settings are
stored in the registry.
To investigate a suspect, it is necessary to
know which settings is default and which
settings are probably changed by the user. By
default, when Windows starts, Ares will load
automatically connect to the Ares network. It
also shows the current status on the Ares
control panel. The user can also choose to
show this status on the main window. If the
user goes to the Control Panel pane, it also
shows the users nickname and how many files
there are shared. When the program starts the
shown window is also the search window.
Although suspects often claim that they were
not aware that they were sharing something,
this is most unlikely. The shared files are
shown on the Library pane which is just one
click away, the current and also the completed
uploads are visible in the Transfer panel and if
a user chooses his Control Panel there is not
only a subpanel to change the shared library
but also the number of current shared files are
visible in the caption.
Personal GUID: When Ares is started
for the first time it will call the API
Cocreateguid found in Microsoft’s windows file
OLE32.dll. This will result in a GUID
(Globally Unique Identifier), a unique reference
number used as an identifier in computer
software This GUID is saved into the value
Personal.Guid under the Ares key in the
registry. If this API is called again it will
create a different GUID. Because the value of
a GUID is 128 bits, it is a ‘unique’ value and it
can be used to trace people who are using
different IP-addresses. If the GUID found on
the network is the same as the stored GUID in
the registry it is strong evidence that shows
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this the computer was used on the network at
that time. However Ares is, unlike other
networks sich as Gnutella, Gnutella2 or Emule,
not sending the GUID over the network during
searches, uploads or downloads. Therefore the
GUID is not very useful for investigations.
Nickname: By default the nickname of
the user is not set by the installation program
and Ares uses an automatic composed
nickname like “anon_531dbe69.” Such
automatic composed nicknames consist of the
prefix “anon_” followed by the public IP-
address of the computer in hexadecimal
format. In this example the 0x531dbe69 stands
for IP-address 83.29.190.105.
If the user does not choose a nickname,
Ares will popup 60 seconds after starting the
program with the question “Would you like to
choose your nickname now?” If a user uses that
popup to change his nickname the program
changes to the “Control Panel Chat settings”
pane and the value “anon_531dbe69” for
example, is shown as his nickname and can
easily be changed. It will be moreover saved to
the registry. For this reason a user who is
using different IP-addresses and did not set his
nickname will be seen with different automatic
composed “anonymous” nicknames. However
we realize many users on the network with
nicknames looking like automatic composed
nicknames as described without changing their
IP-address, making it likely that there are
other Ares clients, probably derived from the
original source, which are saving the automatic
composed nickname by default.
Port number: On the first start Ares is
automatically choosing a port number within
the range from 5000 to 64999 and this port
number is also saved into the registry. A user
can change this port number manually with
the Network settings pane. However we realize
most of the users do not change this port
number.
Shared folders: By default only files in
the Ares ‘My shared folder’ are shared. This
folder is set to the desktop of the user by
default. The setting is stored in the registry
value Sys.Desktop with the value
‘C:\Documents and Settings\<user>\Desktop
\My Shared Folder.’ Files downloaded with
Ares are placed in the download folder, which
is by default the same as the ‘My Shared
Folder.’ If a user changes the default location
for the download folder it is stored in the
registry value Download.Folder. In that case
the location of the Download.Folder becomes
the ‘My shared folder.’ The value Sys.Desktop
is still in the registry with the old value but
that folder is not shared anymore, unless the
user shares it afterwards. The default shared
folder cannot be unshared. Although users can
unclick the share option, this is not changing
the setting and on a restart, the old value
(shared) is checked again.
Searching: The default search option is
‘all’ which means ‘Search for generic media.’
With this feature there are no further search
options available. Besides the ‘Search for
generic media’ a user can choose between
‘Audio,’ ‘Video,’ ‘Image,’ ‘Document,’
‘Software’ and ‘Other.’ Ares uses Sha1-hashing
to identify files and this makes it possible to
combine downloads for one single file from
different users, also known as ‘file swarming’ or
‘multisource downloading.’ The hashes are not
visible in the search window but a user can
make them visible by using the right mouse
button option ‘export HashLink.’ We did
several searches for well know keywords related
to CAM. From the information on the Results
window it is very obvious what the contents of
the results could be. Result information often
contains gender, ages and explicit information
about the sexual aspect.
Downloading and sharing: If a user
attempts to download a file but the sources are
no longer available or the relevant clientnodes
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are too busy, Ares will automatically search for
other sources by using the sha1 hashvalue and
add new sources to the download. For each
started download a separate file is created in
the download folder with a
prefix‘___ARESTRA___’ (3 underscores
ARESTRA 3 underscores) followed by the
filename. This file is used to store the
separated chunks for a download and that will
lead to a complete file when all bytes of the file
are downloaded. At the end of this ‘arestra’ file
there is an appendix used to store the
information about the available sources for this
download. This appendix is removed on
completion of the download. Downloaded files
are shared after the download is completed
unless the file is marked as corrupt.
Preview, watch and listening: While
downloading the user can preview the
downloaded part of multimedia files with a
built-in player. If case of a video file Ares will
create a folder
%localappdata%\ares\data\temp\. The name
of that folder is a random number. Then a
copy of the part that is already downloaded
will be copied to that folder and played from
there. After the preview, it will be deleted
when the user is previewing another file. With
the built in player it is also possible to play
multimedia files stored on the system and that
includes the completed downloads. We could
not find any traces in case Ares was running
and the program was used to play completed
downloads or play local stored multimedia files
by drag and drop these files on the Ares player
window.
The player also supports Shoutcast and it
is also possible that watched movies with
shoutcast are placed in the data\temp folder.
Ares and the registry
Some derived Ares clients, like “Limewire Pro”
and “Limewire Plus” (despite their names,
these clients have nothing to do with Limewire
or Gnutella, but are instead real Ares clients)
store the registry data in the same way, but
with a different key and with additional
values. A user can remove his complete search
history or remove a single search with the Ares
program. In that case the subkeys and
stringvalues will be deleted. Sometimes these
deleted keys can be recovered with the
program YARU (Yet Another Registry Utility)
[19]. Unallocated clusters and restore points
can be used to carve old ntuser.dat files. An
uninstall procedure will remove the registry
keys while updating Ares will keep the old
settings and therefore updating will probably
only have a minor effect like adding new keys.
Besides the keys that are added and changed
by the Ares program, the operating system will
also add and change keys to the registry
during installation, use and uninstall of Ares.
A search for “Ares” within the registry is a
very effective way to discover Ares artifacts
that are caused by the operating system. This
paper however does not cover that aspect.
Overview of registry values
Let’s examine most important registry keys
and values. For each entry there is a row with
4 columns followed by a row with explanation.
Sometimes the valuable information is in the
name of the key or in the name of the value
(searches). The values are coded in Hex or e.g.
in UnixTimeStamp and most of the time in
BigEndian. If needed, the decode and Endian
information is available in the row with
explanation.
Encryption methods used by
Ares for the registry
A lot of the Ares encryption procedures are
combinations of simple XOR and bit shifting
operations. It uses a separate XOR operation
for each byte in a given string. This method is
known as stream cipher encryption [25]. The
initial key for the XOR operation is a
hardcoded word value as input parameter and
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different for each procedure. Only the most
significant byte of this word value is selected
with a shift right 8 operation and that byte
will be used for the XOR operation.
During the encryption of a given string this
XOR-byte (the key) is recalculated by taking
the current processed byte and adding the
value of the current XOR-byte (the key)
followed by a multiply and add operation with
hardcoded values. The differences for the
encryption procedures are the input
parameters (string to encrypt and the key) and
the hardcoded values for the multiply and add
operation for changing the key.
All encryption procedures are written in
the function “helper_crypt.pas,” which is part
of the open source code. The programmers are
also using nested encryption functions like
d67(d64(s,24884),7193). Here follows an
example for the decryption of an important
key with the name Stats.CFRTime. This key is
filled with an encrypted UnixTimeStamp when
Ares was started for the first time. For this
experiment, the value stored in the register is
0x54 5F C0 B2 1C 92 41 CD C3 83. This value
is decrypted with d67(d64(s,24884),7193).
After decrypting, the first character of the
decrypted value is removed because it was a
random added value during encryption. The
first 4 bytes that remain are a UnixTimeStamp
stored in little endian. The following 5 bytes
are used for an integrity check. Byte 5 must be
0x00 and byte 7 and byte 8 are checked
against the value of the first 4 bytes. For this
check these 4 bytes are hashed with a function
called “whaaa,” in the code this function is
commented as “gnutella query routing word
hashing.” After this hashing, a value of 12 is
added and then the value of this result has to
be equal to the value stored in byte 7 and 8.
This integrity check is very important because
the suspect can claim that the value in the
registry could have been changed by a virus or
whatever. Therefore we have to do the
decryption and also check the integrity of that
decryption result.
The whole procedure for the value stored
in the key Stats.CFRTime is as follows. First
we have to run the d64(s,24884) operation. To
make it more readable there is a small
description for the decryption of the first byte
and the calculation of the new XOR key. After
this, the procedure is repeated in the same way
until the encryption is done. The word value to
start the first XOR operation is 24884 or 2
bytes with the values 11000010 00110100. The
shift right 8 operation results in the first byte
11000010 and is used as the (key) XOR-byte in
the first XOR operation.
For the second byte the key has to be
recalculated. The formula used is b :=
(byte(S[I]) + b) * 12559 + 14926; so we have
to take the value of the current byte of the
input string add the value of the current key,
then multiply by 12559 and then add 14926.
The current byte in the input string is
0x54=84 and the current key is 24884. So the
new key is (84+24884) * 12559 + 14926 =
313588038 or
00010010101100001111100101000110b. Because
the variable is a word, only the 2 least
significant bytes are used. Again followed by a
shift right operation, it results in 11111001b for
the new key. And this procedure is repeated
until all bytes are processed in the same way.
Hashchecking “gnutella query
routing word hashing” (Ares procedure
whaaa)
In this example the values of byte 7 and 8 of
the previous decrypted Stats.CRFTime are
checked with the value of the first 4 remaining
bytes. Remember we already dropped the first
random byte and we also checked the 5th byte
to be a Nullbyte. The value 0xD072 has to be
hashed and after this a value of 12 has to be
added. The formula used is word
(whaaa(copy(s,1,4))+12). The result has to be
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equal to the value of the first 4 bytes that are
still in Little Endian. The first step in the
hashing is to first lowercases the input, this
will only effect hexvalues in the range from
0x41 until 0x5a (ascii A-Z). Step 2 is to
convert the result into big endian and then
step 3 is to multiply the result with a
hardcoded hex value of 0x4F1bBCDC. In step
4, the result of this in a 32 bit program like
Ares, and is only the least significant bits. Step
5 is a shift left32 followed by a shift right48.
Step 7 is adding a value of 12 and then step 8,
convert it to Little Endian. Result of the
manual decrypted and decoded data were
compared with Encase Ares Registry Report
(V1.1.0), EnPack and AresDecrypter 1.3 and
there were no differences worth mentioning.
Ares and the folder
%localappdata%
Within this folder there are several files that
contain valuable data for a forensic
examination. During installation Ares will
create the files Snodes.dat, ShareH.dat,
ShareL.dat, FailedSnodes.dat. After running
Ares will also create the file DHTnodes.dat and
depending on which parts of the Ares program
are used and which settings are used, Ares
changes also the files PHashIdx.dat,
ChatroomIPs.dat default.m3u, ‘Shared
Folders.txt,’ avatar.bmp, Avatar.jpg and
MiniAvatar.jpg. Due to the limitation of the
number of words of this paper we only present
the forensic analysis of ShareH.dat.
ShareH.dat
The file ShareH.dat is a permanent file,
created during installation with a header
containing the ascii string
‘__ARESDB1.02H_’ hexadecimal value
0x5F5F415245534442312E3032485F. This file
contains valuable information about shared
files, in the source named as “trusted metas.” A
record for a shared file is added if it contains
Ares data like meta-information or parameters.
Therefore for each unique file that is
downloaded with Ares, a record is added to
this file. In that case Ares will also add a
record in the file shareL.dat. For files that are
not downloaded with Ares but added to the
Ares shared files in another way, e.g. copying
it to the shared folder with the operating
system, there are no records added to this file.
However if a user changes meta-information
with Ares, for such an added file, this will also
result in a record in ShareH.dat for that file
with changed meta- information.
For investigators the contents of
ShareH.dat is extremely valuable because the
records are not removed from the file
ShareH.dat if the shared file itself is deleted,
while records in the file ShareL.dat will be
deleted. Therefore the ShareH.dat is also
known as the ShareHistory, but be careful- it is
only a history of files that contained Ares
information as described before. Besides the
fact that records are not deleted; they also
contain a sha1 hash value for the shared file
making it possible to compare records with
known hashes.
There is a Boolean value in each record
indicating if the file is shared. If a file is shared
that does not mean that the file is downloaded.
It just means that the file was shared and thus
available for downloading.
Ares indicates if a file is corrupt with a
Boolean value. This value False indicates that
there is something wrong with the file. This
could be caused by a fault during downloading.
When a file is completely downloaded the sha1
hash value is used to check if the file is exactly
the same as the source file. If the sha1 value
differs, the file will be marked as corrupt.
Another reason to mark a file as corrupt is
when it is identified as ‘teen content.’ This is
done by a check on category, title, path and
artist with a small list of CAM related
keywords. Looking at the huge amount of
CAM distributed on Ares this filtering is not
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very effective. If a file is marked as corrupt,
the value shared is also marked as false and
the file won’t be shared.
If a file is downloaded with Ares, a record
contains a value ‘filedate.’ This is a
UnixTimeStamp when the download was
completed. The file itself will have a creation
datewhen the download was started.
If a file was not downloaded with Ares but
add to Sharel.dat in another way, e.g.
changing meta -information, this field ‘filedate’
is empty. The field ‘filedate’ in the ShareH.dat
cannot be change by the user. There is a field
with the name Date in the meta-information
that can be changed by the user, but this field
reflects to the field Year in the ShareH.dat
records, which is just a string value (Figure 4).
Decryption of ShareH.dat
The valuable data in the file, which is located
after the header, is stored encrypted. This data
can be decrypted with the same methodology
as described in section 4.2.2. It is an XOR
operation for each byte with the XOR key
given as a fixed value on startup, and changing
for each next XOR operation by using the
value of the current XOR key added with the
current byte of the input string multiplied with
a fixed value of 23219 and followed by adding
a fixed value of 36126. After the header we
have to read the first 23 bytes and decrypt
them. After decryption, the first 20 bytes are
the sha1 hash value of the shared file. The
next byte is a Boolean value and will tell if the
file was shared. The following 2 bytes contain
the length for the rest of the record. This value
is in Little Endian and the maximum value is
1024. Now we know this length we can read
the rest of the record which is still encrypted
and decrypt it with the same code. The xor
key starts again with the value 13871. This
remaining part contains meta-information like
artist, title and comment (Figure 5 and Figure
6). The procedure has to be repeated until all
records are decrypted. The full layout of the
record is available in the pascal file
helper_library_db.pas in the procedure
‘get_trusted_metas’ which is part of the open
source.
CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we aim to give an overview how
the Ares network is functioning. This is
accompanied by an overview about the use of
Ares in relation with the worldwide
distribution of CAM related to countries and
spoken languages.
Figure 4. Changing meta-information with Ares
Forensic Analysis of Ares Galaxy Peer-to-Peer … CDFSL Proceedings 2016
© 2016 ADFSL Page 33
The evidence about the use of Ares, to be
found on a computer, is documented. This
includes a description of the important parts of
the decoding and decryption methods. At the
time of writing this paper, we also worked on
the forensic analysis of the communication
between clientnode and supernode over Ares
network protocol. For analyzing huge amount
of artifact data in ARES P2P network, we are
also looking at efficient data mining techniques
such as [20][21][22][23].
Figure 5. View in hex and ASCII of ShareH.dat
Figure 6. Example of a decrypted record
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